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ABSTRACT
Determinism, the doctrine that every event is made neces-
sary by antecedent factors, is refuted as a universal principle
by showing that it does not apply to man's choice to utilize
his conceptual capacity. The assumption that determinism is
true of man's conceptual capacity is demonstrated to lead to
the impossibility of human knowledge - an untenable conclusion.
Volition is shown to be man's freedom to operate his conceptual
faculty - specifically, that a man's choice to think or not to
think is not made necessary by antecedent factors. The belief
that determinism is a corollary of causality is seen to be the
result of the theory that causality is either (1) a necessary
connection of event to event - a theory which Hume and others
have shown to be indefensible, or (2) merely the observed con-
stant conjucntion of event to event - which cannot be shown to
apply to the choice to think. As an alternative, the traditional
Greek concept of causality as a necessary relation between
events and entities is suggested and supported. Free will is
shown to be compatible with this latter concept of causality.
Introspective evidence for the existence of a free choice is
examined and defended.
"It was as if he had run a race against his own body, and all
the exhaustion of years, which he had refused to acknowledge,
had caught him at once and flattened him against the desk top.
He felt nothing, except the desire not to move. He did not have
the strength to feel - not even to suffer. He had burned every-
thing there was to burn within him; he had scattered so many
sparks to start so many things - and he wondered whether someone
could give him now the spark he needed, now when he felt unable
ever to rise again. He asked himself who had started him and
kept him going. Then he raised his head. Slowly, with the
greatest effort of his life, he made his body rise until he was
able to sit upright with only one hand pressed to the desk and
a trembling arm to support him. He never asked that question
again ." 12
- Ayn Rand
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7 THE PROBLEM DEFINED
No problem can be solved without a clear, precise, un-
equivocal definition of the terms involved. Yet the lack of
definitions singularly characterizes modern philosophy, whether
it be existentialism, pragmatism, or, paradoxically, the ling-
uistic analysis school. The attempt to deal with the problem
of determinism without quite knowing what the concepts of de-
terminism, volition, cause, and knowledge are - i.e., without
a definition of those terms, is largely responsible for the
confusing nature of the arguments which have surrounded this
topic for twenty-five hundred years. The major effort of this
thesis is directed toward presenting and defending definitions
for the central concepts with which either determinism or
else volition must ultimately be consistent. In this sense the
thesis is analytical - but in the same sense all genuine phil-
osophy is analytical.
Determinism is the principle that every event is made
necessary by antecedent factors; the sub-species of determinism
which is important for this thesis is psychological determinism:
the principle that evety event in man's consciousness is made
necessary by antecedent factors over which he has no control.
Since psychological determinism is merely a particular instance
of the universal principle of determinism, I will not bother to
distinguish the two in this paper: if it can be shown that psy-
chological determinism is false, then the general principle has
been contradicted.
The terms "volition", "free will", and "freedom" will be
used synonymously for the position that is the contradictory of
determinism, namely, that there is an event which is not made
2/ _
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necessary by antecedent factors. Since volition is understood
to apply to human beings, and specifically (as will be shown)
to the human mind, it may also be phrased as: the principle
that there is an event in man's consciousness which is not
made necessary by antecedent factors beyond his control. The
term "libertarian" will be occasionally employed to refer to
one who is an advocate of the theory that man has volition. The
use of the phrase "free will" is not to be taken to imply that
there is any special mental faculty or domain called "the will";
it is simply to mean volitional control over some event in man's
consciousness.
The thesis will attempt to prove that determinism (as de-
fined above) is false, and that its logical negation - volition
- is true. In proving this the thsis will consider separately
all the possible categories of arguments: (1) those for volition,
(2) those against determinism, (3) those for determinism, and
(4) those against volition. The thesis is that: (1)' there is
evidence for the existence of free will, (2) determinism implies
the impossibility of human knowledge and is therefore self-
refuting, (3) there is no valid argument for determinism, and
(4) there is no valid argument against free will.
The views of specific philosophers will be dealt with only
in so far as they are arguments for or against determinism or
free will - that is, the thesis is in no sense historical. It is
possible that I have ascribed to some philosopher a view which
is not his. If so, I am responsible, but this should bear no
weight in considering whether the view - independent of who holds
it - is true or false.
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Many principles in metaphysics and epistemology have had
to be presupposed, as their support would require a number of
volumes. The fundamental assumption of the thesis is that the
three Aristotelian laws of logic are axiomatically true of
reality and constitute the basis for all human knowledge. These
laws may be stated as follows: (1) Identity: a thing is itself
E-A = A_7; (2) Non-contradiction: the same thing cannot simul-
taneously have and not have the same property in the same
respect F-not(A & not-A)_7; and (3) Excluded middle: either
a thing has a certain property or it does not CA or not-A_7.
I owe an overwhelming debt for the ideas on which the
thesis is based to the Objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand and
her associate, Nathaniel Branden. Objectivism in turn acknow-
ledges a debt to Aristotle. Of course, no one but myself is
responsible for the interpretation and development of those
ideas which appear in this thesis.
-4-
THE NATURE AND LOCATION OF VOLITION
If the volitional position is that there is at least one
class of events whose occurrence is not made necessary by ante-
cedent factors, then what is this class? What choice does man
have the power to make?
Traditionally, the area of man's volition has been located
in his actions. On this view one has the choice to lift one's
arm, or not to lift it; to lift it to the right, or to the left;
to reach for a book or a gun. The actions of one's consciousness
are included on an equal basis with bodily actions: we are free
to listen, or to refuse to listen; to lie, to tell the truth, or
to remain silent; to think or not to think. In short, everything
which we would ordinarily say a person does, is under that per-
son's volitional control. Without being censurious, this may be
identified as the nai~ve doctrine of free will, since it seems
to be an outgrowth of ordinary discourse - whenever the active
voice is used, volition is assumed (to call this a nairve view
is only to point out that it is the position which occurs spon-
taneously or naturally when one first thinks about the problem).
Although the naijve view is natural to pre-reflective man,
who experiences himself as an integrated organism - not as a
dualism of mind and body, it is a view which leads to many dif-
ficulties. We know from many sources that a man's physical
actions are under the control of his mind. Foremost we know in-
stantly from the briefest reflection that every voluntary phys-
ical action is preceded by a mental decision, and that unless
_ I__
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this decision is made, the physical action does not occur.
Taking the examples used to illustrate the naigve view, whether
or not I lift my arm, whether I lift it to the right or to the
left, whether or not I reach for the book or the gun, all de-
pend upon what I decide to do - on my mental acts. If my arm
should move upwards in the absence of this mental act (as say
from a reflex), we should not say that I lifted it. On the con-
trary it would be said that "his arm jerked up involuntarily",
and if I wanted to deny this description I would do so by main-
taining that I had decided or chosen to perform that action, that
my arm was acting under the control of my mind.
It will be immediately objected that there are many cases
in which an agent is said to perform an action for which no pre-
vious act of decision took place. If, for instance, I am driving
an automobile over a very familiar route, I may be paying very
little attention to the road ahead or road signs, and yet be
performing a complex series of actions unerringly which result
in my going to my destination. Surely there is no "mental debate"
going on inside me; how could I be making decisions as to which
way to turn the wheel while I am thinking about something entirely
different? I mean to use the term "decision" in such a way that
no "mental debate" or conscious deliberation need be implied.
What is to be pointed out is that as long as I am in control of
the car, my mind is in control of my overt actions. At whatever
level of consciousness I might be affording to my car-driving
actions, it is undeniable that I turn the wheel to the right
or left in response to environmental stimuli received through my
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sense organs, transmitted to my brain and - once I have made
the initial decision to drive this route - automatically re-
sulting in the sending of efferent signals to my muscles re-
sulting in the appropriate overt actions. In other words, any
physical actions which the naipve libertarian wants to call
voluntary, are causally dependent on antecedent mental oper-
ations, and consequently are free only in a derivative sense,
and only if these mental operations are free.
What, then, determines whether I reach for the book or
the gun? The determining factor is the goal I have in mind.
Putting it simply, if my purpose is to read, I will take the
book; if my purpose is to shoot, I will take the gun. Given that
my goal is reading, must I take the book, is it necessary that
this particular action be chosen? Yes - with the following
qualifications. It would be a contradiction or a misuse of lang-
uage to say that (1) the book lay before me, (2) I saw the book,
(3) I wanted* to reach for it, and (4) I was physically able to
reach for it (not paralyzed, for example), but that I did not
reach for it. If such initial conditions held and I did not
reach for the book, it would be conclusive evidence for you that
one of the premises was false: that either (1) there was really
no book there at all, (2) I didn't see the book, (3) I really
hadn't wanted to reach for the book (for example, that my fear
of someone's disapproval or my desire to prove a philosophical
point by not reaching was stronger than my desire for the book**),
*I was at the time experiencing the desire.
** See appendix for an illustration.
m=
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or (4) that I was not physically able to reach the book - that
perhaps I was trying, but failing due to physical restraints,
paralysis, or some other factor. The action, then, of reaching
for the book was made necessary by my desire for the book plus
certain other conditions.
More generally, someone will decide to perform an action
if and only if: (1) he is experiencing a desire to perform that
action and (2) he believes he can perform that action*. Conse-
quently, free will cannot be located in a decision to act,
since these decisions themselves depend upon one's desires and
beliefs. To carry the process farther backwards we now ask: what
determines our desires and beliefs?
Our desires are determined by our goals. That is, if I have
education as one of my goals, then, other things being equal, I
will desire to read, if I believe that reading is a primary
means to education. Given that I hold reading as a goal, I will
desire to obtain books, and so on. Clearly, some desires re-
flect a relation between means and ends: I wanted the book be-
cause I saw it was a means to the end of reading, I wanted to
read because I saw that reading was a means to the end of edu-
cation. Why did I desire education? Perhaps as a means to my
career. What dictates my choice of career? What in general
determines a man's basic, fundamental goals - the goals which in
turn shape his more concrete sub-goals in life?
There are in principle two paths open to a man in choosing
his basic goals, such as his career. He may either think about
* See appendix for a more formal proof of this point.
__ ___
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the problem, or not think about it. If he consistently thinks
about what basic goals it would be best for him to pursue, one
set of goals will result (presumably, a set of goals consonant
with the needs inherent in his nature as man). If, alternatively,
he never thinks about what his goals should be, what his goals
in fact turn out to be will be dictated by the goals of his
culture, or the desires of his parents, or accidental associations
formed in his youth, or by any of a number of other non-rational
factors. Given either alternative, that he either thinks about
the problem or he doesn't, the goals he will adopt will be made
necessary by antecedent factors. If he consistently does think
about what goals he should pursue, one set of factors will form
his goals; if he never thinks, a different set will form them.
In short, his goals will either be the result of his thinking,
or they won't.
The two factors which determine a man's basic actions have
been seen to be his basic goals and his beliefs (there is a
third factor which has been implicit in the foregoing and which
will be dealt with explicitly later - namely, whether he pays
any attention to what his basic goals are and to what he be-
lievs to be true). We have just seen that which basic goals a
man pursues can be determined by his thinking. That is, if he
thinks about what are the right goals for him to pursue, this
can affect what goals he does pursue; and if he consistently
thinks about what are the right goals, this will affect his
actual goals. Now we observe that a man's beliefs (the other
factor which goes into determining his actions) quite obviously
depend crucially on the exercise of his cognitive faculty.
-9-
Beliefs are the products exclusively of man's reason, of his
conceptual faculty. Animals have no beliefs. The mere presen-
tation of facts to an individual is not a sufficient condition
for his forming any specific belief about those facts. If the
teacher gives a proof of the principle that three times two is
six, this does not guarantee that Johnny, who is looking at the
board, now believes or understands that three times two is six.
He may simply have not been paying any attention to the proof
or the teacher. Or, he may even have been paying attention to
the proof, but not doing the thinking necessary in order to
understand it, he might have been thinking that this is the
longest proof he has heard today, or that if he were the teacher
he'd never give proofs like that, and so forth. Similarly with
normative beliefs: the mere fact of being presented with moral
statements such as "It's wrong to steal" is not necessarily a
sufficient condition for the listener's acceptance of the prop-
osition expressed in the statement. It's an observed fact that
many people go through an extensive "indoctrination period" in
childhood during which they are ceaselessly bombarded with moral
slogans (sometimes emphasized with beatings) which they simply
never accept.
Any defensible theory of volition must locate man's free-
dom in the choice to use or not to use his cognitive faculty.
This we have seen, is due to the fundamental role played by
man's conceptual faculty in all of his behavior which we would
call"voluntary". A man's overt actions depend upon his desires
and beliefs which themselves depend upon whether or not he has
_____
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exercised his conceptual capacity.
It is in the use of his cognitive or conceptual capacity
that the Objectivist theory of volition locates man's freedom.
"Objectivism locates man's free will in a single action
of his consciousness, in a single basic choice: to focus
his mind or to suspend it; to think or not to think."1
"In the Objectivist theory of volition, a man is respon-
sible for his actions, not because his actions are directly
subject to his free will, but because they proceed from his
values -goals 7 and premises [- beliefs_7, which in turn
proceed from his thinking or non-thinking. His actions are
free because they are under the control of a faculty that
is free - i.e., that functions volitionally.u2
Since man's volition must pertain to the use of his con-
sciousness if free will is to be possible at all, it is cru-
cially important to understand precisely what acts of conscious-
ness do operate by choice, and in what forms the individual
encounters this choice. It has been ssen that one psychological
action which must operate volitionally, on any consistent liber-
tarian view, is thinking. But "thinking" is a notoriously vague
word which needs to be defined. If thinking is defined, as it
sometimes is, as a kind of internal conversation with oneself,
then it loses its signifcance for theories of volitionsince that
kind of "thinking" seems to go on during virtually all of our
waking hours, and more importantly, its occurrence doesn't seem
to bear any necessary connection to our beliefs, values, or
actions. Rather, I will utilize the definition presented by
Nathaniel Branden in the fifth lecture of his series, "Basic
Principles of Objectivism": "Thinking is a purposeful mental
I
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activity having knowledge of reality as its goal." Thinking
includes such activities as the forming of questions, logical
deductions, abstraction, the forming of definitions, the iden-
tification of the evidence provided by the senses* and the
integration of these identifications.
Whether or not a man is thinking is related to a more
fundamental question: what level of awareness is he operating
on? Thinking is an aspect of one's level of awareness, not the
reverse. At the lower levels of awareness, thinking as defined
above is not possible. The sort of organized, purposeful activ-
ity which is thinking, is characteristic of a high state of
awareness. For example, consider the variety of mental states
possible to at man in front of a TV set. First, he might be
totally unconscious. Second, he might be drifting off to sleep,
and experiencing the TV program as only a faint distracting hum.
Third, he could be awake, looking at the screen, and operating
on a mere perceptual level, that is, he sees a man sitting in
front of some other men and hears the words the seated man is
saying, but that is all. Fourth, he could be following the story,
know that the seated man is defending himself at a murder trial,
but be unable to predict the ending, see the significance of
the story, or whether the defendant is innocent or guilty.
Fifth, he might be thinking about the program, able to answer all
the questions the person in the fourth stage couldn't, but drawing
no new conclusions outside the context of the program, and has
not thought about whether the show is good or bad. Sixth, if
he is in the highest level of awareness, he understands the
*E.g., looking at a tree and thinking "this tree has dark bark."
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program, judges its merit, and draws nr conclusions from
the example in the program - he discovers that the reason the
defendant is not to be punished is that he was acting in self-
defense, and he, the viewer, raises the question, "what dis-
tinguishes an act of violence in self-defense from other in-
stances of violence?" - a qubstion which he would not have
raised in a state of lesser awareness. These six stages are
not exhaustive nor necessarily discrete. Further, a man may,
and often does, change his level of awareness in the course
of watching the program. In the Objectivist philosophy the
term "focus" is conveniently used to describe one's degree of
concentration, level of awareness, and the changes between
levels. A man in stage six above is said to be in full mental
focus, while one in stage two or three is quite out of focus.
Raising one's level of awareness is described as focusing one's
mind (or simply "focusing" when the context is understood),
while the lapse to a lower level is going out of focus; or, if
the process of going to a lower level is active, as in the case
of evasion, is unfocusing. The intuitve analogy with optical
focus is a good one - not only because both imply clarity and
increased information content, but also because, just as with
optical focus*, being in focus on one thing implies being out
of focus with respect to everything else. To be fully focusing
your attention on the question of free will, one must neces-
sarily be out of focus with respect to extraneous topics - e.g.,
if you are thinking hard about free will you are not thinking
*See appendix for explanation of optical focus.
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about your up-coming vacation.
There are two aspects to the act of focusing. The first
is that of rasing the level of awareness, as explained above.
The second is the concrete act of applying this awareness to
the problem at hand. The act of focusing must be a focusing
on something; it is by applying one's mind to some specific,
concrete task that one "sets the mental machinery in motion".
For example, when arising in the morning, sitting on the edge
of the bed with my mind in a state of semi-consciousness, I
may snap into focus by asking myself, "All right, what have
I got to do today?" Of course, a state of focus has to be
maintained - it is not the case that, once set, one's mind will
remain at a high level of awareness - it requires an expension
of effort to stay in focus. If I don't make this effort, I
will not think about what I have to do that day; I may fall back
to sleep.
This leads to the first manner in which the issue of
focusing is encountered by an ordinary individual. Primarily,
the dichotomy of focus vs. non-focus is experienced as: effort
vs. non-effort. Secondarily, the effort may be required to over-
come more than "mental inertia"; for example effort may be needed
to keep in focus on the long-term undesirable consequences of
a short-term pleasurable act. Or, effort may be required to use
onels own mind instead of uncritically accepting the beliefs
and goals of others. These three common ways of concretely
running into the choice to think or not to think may be
_ .-_
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summarized in the following three questions:
1) Do I take the trouble to think?
2) Do I take the trouble to think when it may be unpleasant?
3) Do I take the trouble to think when I could let others do
my thinking for me?
It is a man's answers to these three questions which determine
the course of his life and happiness.*
Since man's volition relates to the use of his conceptual
faculty - to his ability to draw abstractions, integrate them,
and form concepts, he does not become actually free until he
has reached the stage in his development at which he can form
and use concepts. (This probably occurs in the second year of
a child's life,) The form in which the infant first becomes
aware of his control is in terms of effort. While operating on
the perceptual level required nothing of him, he learns that in
order to understand the world he has to put forth effort - he
has to concentrate. Of course, for the most simple problems not
much is required of the child. But even with the simple concepts,
such as color abstractions, the child learns** that he can be
mistaken. He can point to an object and say "red", and have
his mother reply, "no, green". Such a thing never occured on
the perceptual level, as perceptions deal only with concretes,
not universals, hence the concept of a purely perceptual error
has no meaning.
Once a child has learned an item of knowledge, he can
*This is the theme of Ayn Rand's Atlas ShruQqed.
**I am not inferring that this learning takes place in words.
K
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automatize it - make it "second nature". Thus an adult needs
to exert no mental effort to do the multiplication table, to
recite a well-known rhyme, or just to use the language; but
initially, the learning of each required effort and attention.
Sometime after the child has a fund of automatized knowledge, he
learns another basic fact about himself: he can evade knowledge
he already has. He discovers that he has areas of knowledge
which aren't automatic, and which he doesn't have to utilize if
he chooses not to. To use an example, suppose a child borrows
a toy, promises to return it by a certain time, and then fails
to do so. He remembers his prom
and feels guilty. He finds he c
thinking about what he already k
He can evade his knowledge by ei
or by refusing to focus at all.
succeed for any length of time,
that he must adopt, since which
determined by what is important
evasion, which was achieved by t
involuntary action? Do we have
think about, given that we have
think at all? The answer is tha
over what thoughts occur to us,
pursue every thought which does
ise after the deadline is past
:an lessen the guilt by not
:nows: that he broke his promise.
ther focusing on something else,
If his process of evasion is to
it is the latter alternative
thoughts will occur to him is
to him. Then was his initial
hinking of something else, an
the power to choose what we
the power to choose whether to
t we have no direct control
but we are able to pursue or not
occur to us. It is as if you
browsing through a bookstore - what books you will find there
is already completely determined and is not open to your imme-
diate choice. But as you wander down the aisles glancing at
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titles, there is nothing which compels you to stop and open up
this book just because you read the title. If it is on a sub-
ject which doesn't appeal to you, or which doesn't suit your
purpose, you can go on to another book, or another section.
Once you do find a book you decide is suitable, however, you can
open it up and investigate it further. The bookstore is analo-
gous to your subconscious*; what books it contains is analogous
to what store of information you've assembled; what order the
books are assembled in is analogous to how orderly your mind
is. This order is dependent upon your past thinking or lack
thereof, just as the order in which the books are arranged
depends upon whether the bookseller filed each book when he
received it, or whether he simply put the new book anywhere -
so that there was no logical connection between books located
together, and so that you in looking through the books would
have an impossible time in finding the book you want. And just
as you can go into the bookstore in a number of different states:
alert, relaxed, or with your eyes closed, so you can operate
mentally in various degrees of focus, from a semi-conscious
daze, to full, purposeful clarity**.
As the child builds up a history of either thinking or non-
thinking, he builds up a character. A character is the dominant
principles exhibited by one's past and present choices. For
instance, one man may chronically elect to substitute others'
* See appendix for what is meant by the subconscious.
** See appendix.
rrrr -~-
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thinking for his own. This man will build up a character of
psychological dependence, since this has been the dominant prin-
ciple exhibited by his choices. It is commonly known that one's
character pre-disposes one to act in certain ways - namely in
agreement with the type of character one has. This observation
is so widespread that some modern philosophers have equated char-
acter with dispositions to act in a specified manner. The
definition given above, however, is more useful, as it points
out that the sequence is: choices, character, more choices.
With the definition of character tied to choices we can explain
that character originates from a man's record of how he has
used, or failed to use, his consciousness. One can, in effect,
condition oneself over a period of years to act in a certain
way psychologically, simply by having consistently acted that
way. It is doubtful that one could ever completely condition
oneself to focus or not to focus, such that one would after a
while never have to choose at all. What seems to be the case
is that the chronic non-focuser finds it increasingly more
difficult, while the consistent focuser finds thinking in-
creasingly easier and more natural to him.
Thus the answer to the determinist claim that a man's
choices are determined by his character, is that each man
forges (and is responsible for) his own character through the
free choices he makes. Further, it seems empirically unjusti-
fied to say even that a man's character completely determines
his choices, but only that it gives him a tendency or disposi-
tion to choose one way rather than another.
* * *
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If a man's present choices are influenced by his earlier
ones, doesn't this put a great emphasis on a man's earliest
choices? And wouldn't this be tantamount to determinism since
a two-year-old can hardly be expected to understand the issues
involved well enough to make the correct decisions? There is
an important confusion evident in these questions. First of
all, there seems to be empirical evidence (admittedly shaky
evidence) that one's very early choices are not as influential
as might be expected, since the child is so young that his mind
is still in a state of flux. It might not begin to "set",
that is, to adopt characteristic rules of operation and means of
dealing with problems until the individual is five, six, or even
until puberty. At least we know that people can undergo radi-
cal character changes in the pre-adult years, changes that
become less and less likely as they grow older.
The main confusion of the question, however, is in how the
choice to focus is envisioned. The choice to think or not to
think cannot be deliberated, weighed, or considered rationally
by the individual. To do these things, he would already have
to be thinking. Deliberation, the weighing of consequences,
and rational consideration all pertain to a high level of aware-
ness which the subject would already have had to choose and vo-
litionally sustain. Even given that the subject, who for one
reason or another is in focus, consciously makes a decision
to think, or that thinking is the best policy, this is no
guarantee at all that he will go by his decision. He is per-
fectly capable of evading his decision, of letting his mind
__ L__
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drift out of focus until he is in such a state that he is not
explicitly aware of his prior decision to think. Instead he
is left with a dim, unidentified feeling of uneasiness which he
may or may not choose to focus and think about. Once he is out
of focus there is no way for him to remind himself of his
decision to focus - except by choosing to focus on the issue.
The choice to focus one's mind, then, is not like the choice of
whether or not to buy a hat; it cannot be the subject of a
conscious, reasoned deliberation. Consciousness, reasoning,
and deliberation are precisely the actions he must choose to
initiate.
Thus, we have been able to relate man's physical actions
to his goals and beliefs, and these to the use of his concep-
tual faculty, but if he is not free in choosing whether to
utilize his conceptual faculty, he is not free at all. The
choice to think or not to think is irreducible. There is no
action a man can perform which is more basic than that of
focusing his mind - of raising his awareness to the level of
thought. Consequently, although we can explain any of a man's
other actions on the basis of the thinking he has done or failed
to do, the choice to think or not to think itself cannot be
explained. There is nothing for this choice to be explained in
terms of - which would be consistent with a libertarian position.
To ask, "Why did he focus?" is to have already abandoned the
concept of human volition.
- I-`
IARGUMENTS FOR VOLITION
What is the nature of the evidence, if any, for the position
that man has volitional control over his conceptual faculty?
Two observations are offered by Branden in his lectures
on psychology as evidence for volition*. First is the phenomenon
of irresistible thoughts. There is a neurosis in which the sub-
ject finds he cannot keep certain thoughts out of his conscious-
ness - that he is no longer in control of his thinking process.
What is significant, is that a person suffering from this
neurosis knows that he is in a pathological condition. Ne feels
that he is no longer fully in control of his conceptual faculty -
and he seeks psychiatric help. In other words, a person who
is unable to exercise his volition feels that this is not his
normal, healthy state, implying that the normal, healthy state
includes the ability to control one's thinking process - to move
around at will, in our bookstore analogy. A person suffering
from this neurosis feels, in effect, that he is not in control
of what "books" he picks up, that there is some irresistible
force causing him to come back again and again to the same
book (i.e., thought).
However, a determinist might reply that the only thing
abnormal about this condition is that the subject's thoughts
are constantly guided back to the same topics - not just that
his thoughts are being guided. On this view, where we go in-
side the bookstore is never subject to our volition, but a
healthy man isn't continually forced back to the same books.
Thus the burden of proof is on the libertarian to demonstrate
that the pathology of irresistible thoughts is evidence for
* Lecture 6, Basic Principles of Objectivist Psychology.
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free will.
The second observation in support of volition meets the
same fate. This is the example of the "free association"
test devised by Freud. In these tests the subject is told by
the psychiatrist to relax his mind, and just let the thoughts
flow without any conscious direction. Doesn't this assume
that the subject is freely able to direct or not to direct his
consciousness? Isn't the psychiatrist assuming the subject has
free will? Not necessarily; when I ask a dog to "sit", I am
not assuming this action is under the dog's volitional control.
The mere fact that the psychiatrist's request is usually fol-
lowed by the subject's "loosening the mental reins" does not
imply that he freely choose to do so. According to the deter-
minist, given that the subject is in a specific state, what he
does with his consciousness is made necessary by the psychia-
trist's statement: no alternative course of action is possible.
The psychiatrist's statement on the determinist view, is another
determining factor with respect to how, or whether, the subject
utilizes his conceptual faculty. Again, the burden of proof
rests with the advocate of volition.
The only direct evidence for volition is one's experience
of control over the functioning of his own mind. This is not
a "feeling of freedom"; it is an experience of control. If
you have ridden on a roller-coaster, would it be more appro-
priate to say that you had a feeling of riding on a roller-
coaster, or that you have had the experience of riding on a
roller-coaster? If you are standing in froat of a painting,
-21-
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and someone should ask you what you are doing, would you reply,
"I am having the feeling of looking at a Dali," or, "I am look-
ing at a Dali"? The only justification for saying that you are
having the feeling of looking at a Dali, that you had a feeling
of riding on a roller-coaster, and that you have a "feeling of
freedom" is in the case where you have some evidence that:
1) there really is no Dali in front of you, 2) you never really
were on a roller-coaster, and 3) you really are not free. Thus,
when the determinist says a "feeling of freedom" is no evidence
for freedom, he is right - but he has begged the question. If
we felt as if we were free, that would be one thing, but what
actually is the case is that we feel* our freedom. The burden
of proof is on the determinist to show independently that we
really are not free, and hence we cannot claim to experience
control - not vice-versa.
The determinist may reply that there is evidence that
what we are feeling is not a feeling of control. "Don't you
feel," he may ask "that your physical actions are under your
control? Yet your physical actions are not themselves free:
they are determined by the actions of your mind. Here is a
case-in which this feeling of control is illusory, hence any
argument from a feeling of control is suspect." The answer is
that the feeling of control over physical action is not illu-
sory. You do control your physical actions, but not directly.
Anything which is under the control of a free faculty is it-
self free. To deny this leads one into absurd consequences:
*I prefer the word "experience" in this context, but "feel"
drives the point home in this parallelism.
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for example, suppose for a moment that my mental decision to do
X instead of Y were itself free, that is, that I freely choose
to do X. Could one maintain that the actions of my body in
doing X were not freely chosen, since my muscular contractions
resulted from my decision, instead of having been "willed" di-
rectly? Or that if I choose to close a door, then the minute I
push on the door the action becomes deterministic since the door
operates deterministically? The only thing which could be
"illusory" in the feeling of control over one's physical actions
would be if one felt that one controlled them directly, that the
source of one's choice was located in the actions themselves.
It is possible for a person to have such an illusory view - the
existence of the naive view of volition testifies to that fact.
The determinists, however, have spent a great deal of effort to
establish that this view is illusory - and their success in this
effort has destroyed their own argument against the validity of
the experience of control. Through various arguments*, they
have debunked the naive view that one feels a direct control
over one's physical actions and/or decisions. These arguments
employ such points as that one's actions and decisions are the
necessary outcome of one's explicit or hidden desires and be-
liefs. Fine. But what they can never show is that the choice
to think, the choice which determines one's desires and beliefs,
is a necessary ourcome of any antecedent factors. The deter-
minist is only doing the libertarian a service by knocking
down the straw-man view that volition is located in decisions
* See appendix for an example.
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concerning physical actions. Unless the determinist can
provide new evidence that your experience of direct control
over your level of awareness is not genuine, he must admit
that it is evidence for the existence of volition. Of course,
there are only two ways for the determinist to attempt this:
1) by relating your level of awareness to some factor in your
consciousness (such as your desires, beliefs, or memories) or,
2) by relating it to factors outside your consciousness (such
as the state of your cortical neurons). If he takes the first
path, you need only point out that factors in one's conscious-
ness are determined by one's level of awareness - that there
are no desires, memories, or beliefs prior to perception and
identification - that nothing in consciousness could compel
consciousness*. But if he takes the second alternative, relating
your level of awareness to some factor outside your consciousR-
ness, he is in even greater trouble - as will be demonstrated
in the next section.
* See infra, page 19.
i --
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST DETERMINISM
One argument that is commonly advanced against the
deterministic thesis that every event in man's consciousness is
made necessary be antecedent factors over which he has no con-
trol, is that were the thesis true, there could be no morality.
Often the point is taken further with the libertarians holding
that determinism, if true, would make legal responsibility a
cruel farce. The first claim, that determinism would make
morality impossible, is correct. The:.purpose of a morality is
to guide man's choices. If a man is only a passive reactor to
forces impinging upon him, then he has no choice. A morality
presupposes an ultimate goal - that toward which man's choices
are to be guided. If determinism were correct, to what extent
an individual can achieve that goal is foreordained; he has no
control whatever over whether he is good or evil; in fact, he
simply has no control, period. As to the claim that determinism
would make reward and punishment, especially legal punishment,
pointless, the consistent libertarian must admit that this does
not follow. If determinism were true, reward and punishment
would probably be two of the crucial molders of human behavior -
just as they are in animal behavior. It would be just as
important to jail a criminal as to scold or beat a mischievous
dog. If determinism were true, refusing to punish criminals and
miscreants would necessarily have disturbing consequences.
Besides, if determinism were true, we wouldn't be able to do
otherwise anyway.
The issue of whether or not determinism would make morality
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and law possible is, however, entirely irrelevant at this
point. If determinism could be proven true, then so much the
worse for morality and law. The far more important, and self-
refuting, consequence of determinism is that it makes knowledge
impossible.
All knowledge begins with, and is based upon, perception.
I know I have a hand because I see that I have a hand. Most
knowledge, however, is not based directly on perception. For
instance, the way that I know universals such as " all living
organisms need food" is not by observing each member of the class
of living organisms. I know that universal is true because I
know it follows logically from other universals such as "all
living organisms move themselves or parts of themselves" and
"whatever moves itself or parts of itself must have an internal
supply of energy". Therefore there are only two ways of justi-
fying a claim to knowledge: by showing that it follows logically
from other knowledge, or by a direct appeal to the facts through
perception.
Thus, when I am challenged to support one of my beliefs I
must either show that it follows from other knowledge, or show,
through perception, that it is the case. There is a third
kind of claim that may be made in support of certain kinds of
beliefs: introspection. Is introspective evidence as valid as
perceptual evidence? It is if introspection is a kind of "in-
ward looking" in which 0, who is perceptually aware of X, is
simultaneously introspectively aware of his awareness of X in
the same way he is aware of X. In other words, on this view of
_i 1~1~
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introspection a person seeing a dog can at the same time see
his seeing of the dog. Fortunately, this view of introspection,
which would lead one into an infinite series of awareness of
awareness of awareness of... - all taking place simultaneously -
is false. For a thorough refutation of this view, which
would be beyond the scope of this thesis, the reader should
refer to the chapter "Self-Knowledge" in Gilbert Ryle's The
Concept of Mind3 . Rather than being a direct inner observation
of conscious events, the subject of introspection is one's
memory of mental events. Thus the way one knows one is seeing
a dog, is through shifting one's attention from the dog at
time t, to the memory at t2 of seeing the dog at tl. All
introspection is based on memory - though on very recent memory.
An appeal to introspective evidence is valid only if very re-
cent memory is valid. One cannot claim to be immediately or
directly aware of what is going on in one's mind in the exact
present - one can only claim to remember what was going on a
very short time ago.
What, then, is required for one to know that his belief
that X is true is justified? What must one do to claim that
his beliefs constitute knowledge?
It is not enough for one to show that X is true. For
instancy, I might flip a coin to decide whether or not it is
going to rain tomorrow, and I might turn out to be right. But
this would be mere coincidence, since we know no necessary con-
nection between the coin's coming up heads, and whether it will
rain tomorrow.
I"
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In order to claim that his belief, X, constitutes know-
ledge, one must have a good reason for believing X, and one
must validate X by going over one's reasons for believing X,
making sure they are true, then making sure they imply that X
is true. It is only when one has verified his belief in that
manner by careful checking of one's premises and one's logical
operations that one can have knowledge instead of mere belief.
Now let's suppose that determinism is true. Then every
event in a man's consciousness is made necessary by antecedent
factors over which he has no control. If he focuses his mind,
believes not-A, he had to. Now let's assume that a man can
know something, and show that this assumption leads to a con-
tradiction. If a man knows something, X, he must know a good
reason for believin 
X If what he believes 
is not even
indirectly under his control, then the cause of believing X may
not be related to why X is true. For instance, a man may
believe X because of a sexual desire (Freudian determinism),
or because of his early childhood (environmental determinism),
or because of the state of his brain (physiological determinism).
But none of these constitute a valid reason for believing X to
be true. The only valid reason for believing X is that the
logical and/or empirical grounds for X led him into believing
X, not that his early environment, his sexual desires, or the
state of his brain led him into it. Consider, for example,
whether you would think someone knew that it would rain
· 1-8
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tomorrow if you asked him how he knew this and heard him reply:
"My sexual needs led me to that conclusion" or, "I believe it
because I was deprived as a child" or, "I believe it because
of the state of my brain."* Of course no determinist, hopefully,
would offer such explanations for his beliefs. He would say
that factors related to X made him believe X. But this is
merely to claim that the factors which made necessary his belief
were related to X, and we know he might very well be determined
to say the same thing even if the factors which made him believe
X were completely unrelated to X. More importantly, how is he
himself to know that the factors which determined him to
believe X are related to X? If he believes (he believes X
because he was led to X by the logical and/or empirical grounds
for X), how does he know he was led to the belief in parentheses
by logical and/or empirical grounds rather than by extraneous
factors? Every belief he holds, on the determinist assumption,
may have been forced upon him by non-rational factors, and he
has no way to exclude that possibility.
The same argument can be applied on the level of verifica-
tion. One doesn't know a belief is true until one has verified
it. How does one whose mind is determined know he has verified
a given belief? Just because he believes he has verified the
belief doesn't mean he actually has. Does he know introspec-
tively that he has checked or is checking? Not necessarily,
since introspection operates on memory and whether his memory
* Although some people claim to know when it will rain by the
state of their feet, no one, so far, has explicitly claimed to
know it by the state of his brain.
1
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is correct or not is not under his control. It may very well
be that he hasn't checked, but was determined to think he
remembers checking.
The conclusion for both arguments is that if one believes
what he has to believe, there is no way for him to know any-
thing because there is no way for him to know that he has a
good reason for any of his beliefs or that he has verified any
of his beliefs.
It may be objected that the mere possibility that he is
led into his beliefs by non-rational factors isn't enough to
discredit the determinist's claim to knowledge. The trouble is
that on the determinist assumption, there is no way for a man
to exclude that possibility, no way for him to tell whether
he is determined by rational factors or by non-rational factors.
If he cannot know whether the factors determining him are rational
or not, he cannot know that they are rational, and hence cannot
know that any of his beliefs are justified.
Because the wording is inescapably complex, two examples
of the same reasoning as used above, will be useful. First,
suppose you don't know whether there is one coin in my pocket
or two coins in my pocket. Then, you don't know that there is
one coin in my pocket, and if you cannot know whether there
are one or two, then you cannot know that there is one. Second,
suppose you are to tell whether a bird we both see is or is not
a robin. Suppose further that you are sure it's a robin because
it has a certain characteristic, C. If I remind you that there
is another type of bird - not a robin - which has C also, so
D I~
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that a bird might have C and not be a robin, you would either
have to find more evidence or give up your claim to know that
it is a robin. Similarly, suppose you are to tell whether a
given belief has or has not been verified, and you are sure
it has been verified because you remember having gone over it
very carefully. If I remind you that you might be determined
to remember going over it very carefully and not have gone over
it at all, you would either have to find more evidence or give
up your claim to know you have verified the original belief.
Or, similarly, suppose you are to tell whether a given belief
was or was not determined by rational factors, and you are sure
it was determined by rational factors because you remember having
thought about it, checked it, gone over it very carefully, etc.
If I remind you that you might be determined to remember doing
all that and yet not have actually done any of it, you either
would have to find more evidence or give up your claim to know
you were led to the belief by rational factors.
The question may be raised whether knowledge is any the
more possible on the free will assumption by the above argument.
If the argument against determinism hangs on the point that any
belief may be, in effect, a rationalization - including the
belief that any other belief is not a rationalization, how can
a being whose mind operates volitionally know that his beliefs
aren't rationalizations? The answer is that when a volitional
being rationalizes, he rationalizes by choice; whether or not
he rationalizes is under his control. If he chooses to ration-
alize, he can know he made that choice. Consider the following
~~
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argument between A, the skeptic, and 8, the libertarian.
A: For any given belief you hold, how do you know it's
not a rationalization?
8: Things cannot force me to rationalize. If I rationalize,
then I chose to rationalize. If I chose to rationalize,
then I can know I made that choice.
A: Then how do you explain the existence of people who
don't know they rationalize?
B: They chose not to know. They evaded, volitionally, their
knowledge that they have not chosen to verify the belief
in question, and that they chose not to be guided by
their perception of reality in forming that belief.
A: Do they know that they chose not to know they chose to
rationalize?
B: Yes, if they haven't evaded that knowledge also. They
know, for instance, that they chose to throw their minds
out of focus when the question of their rationalizations
came up.
A: What about the ones who don't know that they chose not
to know that they chose to rationalize?
B: You can keep adding "chose not to know that ... " in
front of the last question forever, but whichever was
the last evasion they performed, they know (if they are
not psychotic) they performed it.
G.E.M. Anscombe has raised an objection which applies to
the argument that determinism implies the impossibility of know-
ledge. The objection was raised by Miss Anscombe against a some-
what similar argument offered by C.S. Lewis.4 She holds, as I
understand it, that the two senses of "because" illustrated by
such statements as (1) It's true because it follows from the
premises, and (2) It fell because the rope broke, are used
equivocally in the argument. "...such an argument as this
-Lewis'_7 is based on a confusion between the concepts of
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cause and reason, which arises because of the ambiguity of
such expressions as "because" and "explanation"."5
One crucial premise in the argument against determinism
is: if V believes X because of extraneous factors, then he
has no right to claim X as knowledge. In support of this
premise, it was stated that in order for V to know X, he must
have a good reason for believing X, and that if the reason he
believes X is not related to X's truth or falsity, then this is
not a good reason for believing X, and 0 cannot claim to know
X. This, I believe Miss Anscombe would hold, is another form
of the same equivocation between logical justification and causal
explanation, this time equivocating with the word "reason".
might know a quite adequate logical justification of X, even
in the case where he believes X because of (in the causal sense)
extraneous factors. "It appears to me that if a man has reasons,
and they are good reasons, and they are genuinely his reasons,
for thinking something - then his thoughtis rational whatever
causal statements we make about him." 6 I don't believe it would
be unfair to paraphrase Miss Anscombe thusly: It is possible for
someone to maintain, "I accept every idea that pleases my mother,
and if I don't believe an idea would please my mother I don't
accept it - but I can still know which of the ideas I accept are
true and which are not." This seems to be plausible enough until
one remembers that to believe an idea is to believe it is true,
and to accept or hold an idea means to accept or hold it as
true. If I believe a certain idea is true, then I have accepted
that idea; if I believe an idea to be false, then I have rejec-
ted that idea. To say "one of my beliefs is not true" is to
r
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utter a contradiction (unless one meant, "one of my beliefs
was false"). The original statement could be re-written: "I
believe to be true every idea I believe pleases my mother, and
if I don't believe an idea would please my mother, I don't
believe it to be true - but I can still know which of the
ideas I believe to be true are true and which are not." To
decide to accept X is to decide that X is true. It is by de-
ciding that X is true that one accepts X. Thus the above
statement implies, "I decide that X is true on the basis of
whether or not I believe it would please my mother."
Miss Anscombe's objection itself rests on an equivocation.
"Giving one's reasons for thinking something," she writes, "is
like giving one's motives for doing something." There are two
meanings of "thinking" which are confused: the first meaning is
thinking as a process (e.g., "he was thinking something to him-
self"), the second is thinking as believing (e.g., "he thinks
something is wrong"). There is an analogy between thinking in
the first sense and doing, but it's difficult to find any be-
tween believing and doing - but even if there is, it is not at
all clear that this would help Miss Anscombe's case. In any
event, none of the objections serve to dislodge the premise
that if 0 believes X to be true because of extraneous factors,
then he has no right to claim X as knowledge. Miss Anscombe's
objection amounts to a subtle variation of the claim that V
might know that the factors which made it necessary that he
believe X to be true are related to X's being true. It has
been pointed out earlier (page 29) that there is no way for
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to know that this is the case.
There is another, but less rigorous, proof that deter-
minism would imply the impossibility of knowledge. One of the
prerequisites of knowledge is belief - yet determinism would
make even that impossible. A belief involves something being
accepted as true. If the acceptance of X was necessitated by
antecedent factors beyond one's control, one did not accept X,
one merely reacted to X in a certain way. Machines do not
believe anything. If determinism is true, then men are merely
super-complicated mechanisms, and belief becomes only a dis-
position to act in a certain way. To say a machine "believes"
A is true could only mean that the machine acts as if A were
true. One's beliefs do go into determining one's actions, but
the disposition to act in accordance with a belief is a neces-
sary result of having that belief; the belief is not identical
to the disposition.
Since determinism implies men can know nothing, it is
false. Men quite obviously do know something - to maintain the
opposite is self-refuting. Neither can one say that perhaps
determinism is true and we don't know that it is true, we don't
know anything is true, we only think we do. To claim to know
that possibility exists, one would have to know that deter-
minism is, in fact, false. That man knows something is an axiom:
it must be assumed in any attempt to deny it. Any theory, like
determinism, which implies that man knows nothing, is axiomati-
cally false.
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ARGUMENTS FOR DETERMINISM
It would seem that the only real argument for determinism
is that determinism is an outgrowth of the principle that every
event has a cause which is another event antecedent to it, and
if so, the whole doctrine of determinism rests on a confusion.
No supportable formulation of the law of causality implies that
every event in man's consciousness is made necessary by ante-
cedent factors over which he has no control. To establish this
contention, it will be necessary to understand just what
causality is.
The modern, post-Renaissance view of causality has been
well stated by Brand Blanshard. "... what is meant by saying
that an event is caused? The natural answer is that the event
is so connected with some precedinlevent that unless the latter
had occurred the former would not have occurred."7 Or again,
Russel puts it in terms of predictability:
"The law of universal causation ... may be annunciated as
follows. There are such invariable relations between dif-
ferent events at the same or different times that, given the
state of the whole universe throughout any finite time, how-
ever short, every previous and subsequent event can theore-
tically be determined as a function of the given events during
that time."8
It is true that on this view as stated by Russel, determin-
ism is a corollary of the law of causality. If causality is the
theory that every event is made necessary by antecedent events,
it is certainly true that every mental event - including the
functioning of man's conceptual faculty - was made necessary by
antecedent factors. But is this mechanistic concept of causality
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defensible? What is the exact relation between cause and
effect, and how would we know that such a connection must
alway;s exist between events? Blanshard leaves open the ques-
tion of whether or not the relation is one of necessity:
"By determinism, then, I mean the view that every event
A is so connected with a later event B that, given A,
B must occur. ... Now, what is meant here by 'must'?
We cannot in the end evade that question, but I hope
you will not take it as an evasion if at this point I am
content to let you fill in the blank in any way you wish.
Make it a logical 'must', if you care to, or a physical
or metaphysical 'must', or even the watered-down 'must'
that means 'A is always in fact followed by B.'" 9
I etls oroceed to "fill in the blank" as Blanshard suooests. We
have two alternatives: we may either say that "A causes B" means
"A makes the occurrence of B necessary", or we may say that "A
causes B" means only that "A and B are constantly conjoined".
Suppose we adopt the first alternative. Then we are vulnerable
to all the empiricists' and positivists' arguments to show that
there is no way in which we could have arrived at the concept
of necessity in causal relationships. We cannot observe per-
ceptually any "link" or "bond" between events in a causal se-
quence, and we cannot derive such "links" or "bonds" a priori.
For a good discussion of these arguments, the reader should
refer to chapter 4 of John Hospers' An Introduction to Philosophical
Analysis10, especially pages 221-230. On page 229, Hospers
quotes from a paper by Moritz Schlick which typifies the themes
of these arguments:
"This shows that we are perfectly right when we think of
cause and effect as connected by a causal chain, but that
we are perfectly wrong when we think that this chain could
consist of anything but events, that it could be a kind of
mysterious tie called 'causality'... After the scientlest
let rce o"ili tebl "a lnhr ugss
U·;
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has successfully filled up all the gaps in his causal
chains by continually interpolating new events, the phil-
osopher wants to go on with this pleasant game after all
the gaps are filled. So he invents a kind of glue and as-
sures us that in reality it is only his glue that holds
the events together at all. But we can never find the glue;
there is no room for it, as the world is already completely
filled by events which leave no chinks between them."11
So let us take the second alternative in interpreting
Blanshard's "must" and say that there is no necessary connection
between events - only constant conjunction. In this case, to
say that A causes B is only to observe that A and only A is
invariably conjoined with B; that whenever we see A occur, we
no such precursor could ever be found, because none exists.
Either way we interpret Blanshard's statement of the modern
view of the relation between causal events, we cannot support
the determinist position. If we interpret causal relations as
see B's occurrence follow. If this is all that causality comes
to, why must we assume it holds universally? What evidence have
we that any antecedent event is constantly conjoined with the
act of focusing one's mind? Given the present primitive state
of neurophysiology, it would be ludicrous to say that we know of
any neural events which invariably occur just prior to the act
of focusing and at no other time. It might be advanced that even
if a constantly conjoined "precursor" to the event of focusing
was found, this would not imply the act was not volitional. I
think this would be unjustified, however. Volition requires
that the antecedent conditions might have been exactly as they
were prior to a man's choice to focus his mind, and yet he not
have chosen to do so. The libertarian position must hold that
a,. %o M L lae, P M in "i, I t 4_n euhosso to es o ne t o•t f .o a nd th~t
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involving necessity, we are unable to support the existence of
such a relation between any two events. If, alternatively, we
say that constant conjunction is all that is involved, we have
no grounds for supposing that there is any antecedent which is
so conjoined with the specific act of focusing one's mind.
"...today's view of causality dates only from the post-
Renaissance period and is a great philosophical mistake."1 3
-- Ayn Rand
All the arguments against causality as necessary connection
have been predicated on the assumption that causality is a
relation between event and event. The traditional Greek view,
and that of the Objectivist metaphysics, is rather that causality
is a relation between actions and entities which act.
Windelband writes in his History of Philosophy;
"... the idea of cause had acquired a completely new siq-
nificanceEThrough Galileo. According to he scholastic
conception (which even in Descartes' Meditations, in a
decisive passage, was still presented with axiomatic val-
idity) causes were substances or things, while effects, on
the other hand, were either their activities or were other
substances and things which were held to come about only
by such activitiess this was the Platonic-Aristotelian
conception of the aitia. Galileo, on the contrary, went
back to the idea ofthe older Greek thinkers, who applied
the causal relation only to the states - that meant now
to the motions of substances - not to the Being of the
substances themselves." 1 4 Lemphasis is Windelband's_7
Also, Randall points out in his Aristotle:
"The unfortunate neglect of the other three jEypes of
causes 7has been due to the dominance of mechanical
thinking since the day of Newton, complicated by the pop-
ular heritage of Hume and John Stuart Mill. It is worth
noting, incidentally, that the empiricist notion of cau-
sation as constant succession, of "cause" as the invaria-
ble antecedent of its effect, is wholly lacking in
Aristotle. Cause and effect are always for him simultaneous,
hama."n15
Z- -- --
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The objections to the modern event-to-event theory as
well as the substantiation of the older event-to-entity theory
are covered by H.W.B. Joseph in his Introduction to Logic.
Particularly to the point is the following excerpt:
"And there is another objection to defining the cause of
anything as its invariable antecedent. Antecedent and con-
sequent are events. But we cannot treat the world as a mere
procession of events; there are also things to which events
happen. ... Cause no doubt implies change and succession.
But there can be no change without something which changes,
i.e., which persists through a succession of states. It
would not be change but substitution , if one event suc-
ceeded another, and there were nothing but the events.
Whatever difficulties there may be in understanding what
a substance is, or the relation of a thing to its attributes,
it is a desparate remedy to offer us instead a 'stream' of
events, loose and disconnected, in relations of simultaneity
and succession." 16
(For a further and very excellent argument on the same subject
by Josephi, see the appendix)
The basic explanation of causality and its relation to the
issue of determinism vs. volition can be given deceptively
simply:*
1) All actions, changes, and motions are actions, changes, and
motions of entities.
2) What an entity can do depends upon what it is - what its
identity is.
3) The identity of man is such as to allow him the choice of
whether or not he focuses his mind, Man is, by nature, a being
whose conceptual faculty operates volitionally.
Thus the libertarian position does not contradict the law
of universal causality - when that law is formulated correctly.
"The law of causality is the law of identity applied to
action. All actions are caused by entities. The nature
TL 
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of an action is caused and determined by the nature of
the entities thue act; a thing cannot act in contradiction
to its nature."''
What is the nature of man? The lower animals have a nature such
as to allow them to control their bodily actions through the
faculty of consciousness. Man can regulate and control his con-
sciousness itself, with certain limits. Man has to cause his
own mind to function (with respect to the conceptual level); the
cause of focusing lies within himself. Choice is not the excep-
tion to causality; it is not an accident when a man's mind is
focused, unless causality is construed as an event-to-event
relation. This latter, which is a mechanistic or "billiard-
ball" theory of causality, means that every action is only a
reaction - a position which leads one into such paradoxes as
the alternative between an infinite retrogression of antecedent
events (which is impossible), and a "First Cause" (which is
irrational, and itself requires explanation).
It will no doubt be objected that the action-to-entity
theory of causality is trivial and empty of factual content,
and that the assertion that man's nature allows him choice begs
the question. To the first objection we should ask: If this ver-
sion of causality is trivially true and empty of factual con-
tent, how is it that philosophers such as David Hume can assert
things to be conceivable and/or possible which contradict it?
Hume implicitly denies the principle that what a thing is de-
termines what it can do in the following passage from his Inquiry:
"may I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body
falling from the clouds and which in all other respects
resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of
I_
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fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to
affirm that all the trees will flourish in December and
January, and will decay in May and June?" 18
It is currently fashionable to dismiss truths of wide
application, such as the laws of logic, as non-informative and
trivial. But while such principles are not informative in the
same way that stockmarket quotations are, they are nonetheless
true and meaningful - and in the long run a lot more valuable
than stockmarket quotations.
As to the objection that the libertarian position begs the
question, it is to be replied that rather it is the determinist
who has been begging the question all along. The determinist
has asserted that every event in man's consciousness is made
necessary by antecedent factors beyond his control. When asked
for evidence in support of his position, the determinist points
to his version of the law of causality. But determinism is just
a particular instance of that view of the law of causality, and
it is precisely the idea that that version of causality applies
to man's conceptual faculty that the libertarian is asking the
determinist to support. It is as if one were to ask a friend
why he thought there couldn't be a black swan, and to get back
the answer that the law of universal coloration implies that
all swans are white. Upon asking what the law of universal colo-
ration is, you are given the reply: it's the principle that
every swan is white.
On the action-entity theory of causality, to say that
causality implies man cannot have free will is equivalent to
saying: since things can only do what their nature allows them
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to do, man cannot have a nature which allows him to focus
volitionally. That is, of course, a complete non-sequitor. The
only thing which follows directly from the action-entity theory
is that man can only do what his nature allows him to do. If the
determinists think there is some impossibility in man's nature
being such as to allow him volition, the burden of proof is on
them to prove this impossibility, and to prove it by something
other than a reference to causality.
Sometimes the attempt is made to prove this impossibility
by holding that since the brain of man is ultimately composed
of ordinary electrons and protons, free will would involve a
violation of the laws of science for these units, and is hence
false. But the argument overlooks the fact that the properties
of the whole are not necessarily the same as the pr~erties of
the parts. No one is maintaining that it is the electron or
proton which has free will. Volition is an attribute of man -
and specifically of the organ of man's consciousness: his
brain.
Although most of the philosophical predilection for de-
terminism no doubt stems from the belief that it is implied by
causality, much of the "popular" favor for determinism rests on
the idea that one's environment determines one's character.
Most, or all, of the alleged evidence for environmental
determinism is predicated on the assumption that man's volition
is located in his actions and beliefs. All attempts at uncondi-
tional explanation of behavior in terms of environmental influ-
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ences fails when it is realized that the choice to think or
not to think is the choice which controls what a man will be-
lieve and do. This choice may be rephrased as the choice whether
or not one will seek to understand oneself and the world
around one. Merely being confronted with a particular envi-
ronment, whether it be rational or irrational, cannot determine
whether or not you will seek to understand that environment,
nor does it control what conclusions you will draw, nor what
evaluations you will make. For example, consider two brothers
brought up in a home dominated by grossly irrational parents.
One brother gives up the struggle to understand his parents,
feeling (if he could put it into words) that the realm of human
motivation and psychology is incomprehensible by its very
nature. The second brother, however, doesn't ever stop trying
to understand what makes his parents act as they do. He may not
find out until he is forty, he may never find out, but he never
declares the realm of human action unkowable, as his brother did.
A different kind of character and personality would result
from the different choices of these two brothers.
Similarly, no parental action could prevent a child from
focusing if he chooses to. Firstly, there would be no way for
the parents to know when the child was focusing, so that aside
from general commands such as "Don't think so muchl" there isn't
any way for the parents to punish the specific act of focusing.
Secondly, the mere fact of meeting with disapproval or even
physical beating could not compel a child to "shut off the
internal machinery", to blank-out his mind. In fact, one of
the most important choices one has to make is whether one will
keep one's mind functioning through distress, pain, and fear.
____ _ ___
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST VOLITION
As far as I know, there is only one argument against
volition, per se, and that is that the existence of volition
would make a science of psychology impossible. If the argu-
ment that determinism implies the impossiblity of knowledge
stands, then the exact opposite is true: without the existence
of volition, no science of psychology would be possible. Be-
cause man's volition is located in the very basic choice to
think or not to think, once given this choice, many rigor-
ously scientific predictions are possible. All the statements
psychology arrives at will have to be in the form: of hypo-
theticals. The antecedents of these hypotheticals will have to
be explicitly or implicitly:"if 0 continues to think;"or,"unless
F- begins to think.'The extensive science of psychology being
developed by Nathaniel Branden is in fact based upon the theory
that man is a being whose conceptual faculty functions voli-
tionally. The rather startling success of psychotherapy based
upon his theories testifies to the compatibility of volition and
a science of psychology.
_ _____ __ _ ___.
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CONCLUSION
It has been argued that determinism, the theory that every
event in man's consciousness is made necessary by antecedent
factors tond his control, leads to the impossibility of
human knowledge and is consequently self-refuting. The alleged
evidence for determinism provided by the position that causality
implies determinism was seen to rest on an unsupportable notion
of the nature of the causal relation. The possibility of any
empirical evidence for environmental determinism was denied. The
Objectivist view that man's volition is located in the function-
ing of his conceptual faculty was shown to be the only consis-
tent alternative to determinism, and the Aristotelian-Objectivist
view of causality, which is consistent with man's volition, was
described and briefly supported. Introspective evidence in sup-
port of free will was held as prima facie valid, but the exis-
tence of free association tests and irresistible thoughts was
discounted as evidence for volition. The argument that the
existence of volition would be incompatible with a science of
psychology was disposed of. In sum we are left with no arguments
for determinism, introspective evidence for volition, a proof
that determinism is false, and no arguments against volition.
L
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APPENDIX
Page 6. "A determinist once engaged in a public debate with an
"indeTerminist" - i.e., a person who rejects determinism. The
debate took place in a college classroom. By the rules of the
college everybody had to be out of the building not later than
11 P.M. In the course of his talk the determinist predicted
that his opponent would not be in the room or in the building
at 2 o' clock, the following mCning. The indeterminist defied
this prediction. He stayed on, presumably spent a miserable
night, had himself discovered in the morning by the cleaning
woman, and made sure that he was reported to the dean in charge
of such matters for breaking the rules of the college. His
action of course falsified the determinist's prediction and
greatly surprised all who had been present at the debate.
Nevertheless, everyone who heard of the indeterminists bizarre
performance had no doubt that it was just as much due to a
cause as any of his other, less unusual actions. Moreover, if it
had been known that he was eager to defy the prediction, and
furthermore that this desire was stronger than his desire for
a comfortable night, the outcome could have been predicted."
Edwards & Pap, page 311.
Page 7. A formal proof of the general practical
1. 0 wants to do X when conditions C hold
2. $ can do X
3. 0 believes he can do X when conditions C hold
4. • believes conditions C hold
5. (1&2) -- wants to do X
6. 1
7. 2
8. 1&2
9. $ wants to do X
10. 2 -- (0 chooses to do X m--u does X)
11. 2
12. 0 chooses to do X -- $ 0 does X
13. (9&3&4) --- 0 chooses to do X
14. 9
15. 3
16. 4
17. (9&3&4)
18. 0 chooses to do X
19. 0 does X
20. 4 -4 19
21. 3 4 19)
22. 2 3 (4 •9 7
23o 1 2 T (4 Z-4 19) _7Q.E .D.
syllogism:
Assumption
Assumption
Assumption
Assumption
From definitions
1
2
K+
C- on 5
Def. of 2
2
C- on 10
Empirical (?)
9
3
4
K+
C-
C-
C+
C+
C+
C+
on
on
on
on
on
on
13
12
4 & 19
3 & 20
2 & 21
1 & 22
It may be objected that giving in to temptation constitutes a
counterexample to the practical syllogism. I am assuming in
saying "1 is experiencing a desire for X", however, that 0 pre-
--I r
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sently evaluates X to be desirable in the total context he
is projecting to be entailed by X. That is, $ will experience
a desire for X if he feels the positive or desirable conse-
quences of having X outwiegh the negative or undesirable con-
sequences. In the case of the weak-willed man who gives in to
temptation, he simply doesn't consider the undesirable conse-
quences. For example, the man who is adrift on a liferaft without
fresh water may "know" in an abstract sense that it is not de-
sirable to drink the salt-water of the ocean which surrounds him.
But if he doesn't make an effort to focus on this knowledge and
remind himself of it - if he only thinks, in effect, "I want
water, there is water", he will certainly drink. In general it
id easier to blank-out long-range consequences than the ones
which are immediate, urgent, and almost staring one in the face.
Page 12. If the rays of light from a point X are in focus at
point Y, then light rays from a point either nearer to or far-
ther from Y than X is, will be out of focus at Y.
Page 16. This analogy and the other analogies and metaphors used
in this paper are just analogies and metaphors. There are fewer
more disastrous or widespread errors in the history of philosophy
than the belief that there really is a mental bookstore, that
introspection is a process of real observation directed inward
(wherever that is), and that in perception what one perceives are
his experiences instead of real things. Introspection is treated
more intensively in later parts of the thesis.
Pa e 16. The subconscious mind consists of all the information
actual and normative) which is not presently in the forefront
of an individual's consciousness, but which he has learned and
accepted. Thus the subconscious has no content at birth, and it
never has any "will of its own" - it only operates upon the
bleliefs and goals one accepts. The best analogy to the sub-
conscious is that of the electronic computer. Obviously, this
theory is a far cry from the Freudian view of the subconscious
as a mysterious latent force.
Page 23. Brand Blanshard gives a good argument against the naive
feeling that we choose our actions directly:
"After the noise of argument has died down, a sort of intuition
stubbornly remains that we can not only lift our hand if we
choose, but that the choice itself is open to us. Is this not an
impressive fact?
"No, I do not think it is. The first reason is that when we
are making a choice our faces are always tRgned toward the future,
toward the consequences that one act or the other will bring us,
never toward the past with its possible sources of constraint.
Hence these sources are not noticed. Hence we remain unaware that
we are under constraint at all. Hence we feel free from such
constraint. The case is almost as simple as that. When you con-
sider bting a new typewriter your thought is fixed on the pleasure
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and advantage you would gain from it, or the drain it would
make on your budget. You are not delving into the causes that
led to your taking pleasure in the prospect of owning a
typewriter or to your having a complex about expenditure. You
are too much preoccupied with the ends to which the choice
would be a means to give any attention to the causes of which
your choice may be an effect. But that is no reason for
thinking that if you did preoccupy yourself with these causes
you would not find them at work. You may remember that Sir Francis
Galton was so much impressed with this possibility that for
some time he kept account in a notebook of the occasions on
which he made important choices with a full measure of this
feeling of freedom; then shortly after each choice he turned
his eye backward in search of constraints that might have been
acting on him stealthily. He found it so easy to bring such
constraining factors to light that he surrendered to the deter-
minist view."
Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, p. 21.
Paqe 40. "If a thing a under conditions c produces a change x
in a subject s - if, for example, light of certain wave-lengths,
passing through the lens of a camera, produces a certain chem-
ical change (which we call the taking of a photograph of Mount
Everest) upon a photographic film - the way in which it acts
must be regarded as a partial expression of what it is. It could
only act differently, if it were different. As long therefore
as it is a, and stands related under conditions c to a subject
that is s, no other effect than x can be produced; and to say
that the same thing acting on the same thing under the same
conditions may yet produce a different effect, is to say that
a thing need not be what it is. But this is in flat conflict
with the Law of Identity. A thing, to be at all, must be some-
thing, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion
between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is
what it is; be6aus4 in fact, It is a. ... The fact of change is
not disputed, nor the difficulty of finding two things that are
qualitatively the same. But if the second has a different ef-
fect, that must be because of its qualitative difference fromjhe
first, and not merely because it is a second; and so far as it
is qualitatively the same, the effect must be the same also ...
What holds for the relation of subject and attribute holds in
this respect eo ipso for that of cause and effect. To suppose
that the same cause - other things being equal - can have dif-
ferent effects on two occasions is as much as to suppose that
two things can be the same, and yet so far their attributes
different. "
Introduction to Lojic, pp. 408-409.
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